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Imagine that you receive in the mail an envelope from a law firm. Inside is
(what we in the legal profession know as) a summons and complaint and a form
to be signed and returned acknowledging “service” of these papers. The
complaint accuses you of some kind of infringement and/or dilution of a
trademark or perhaps cybersquatting if you registered an internet domain name
or domain names. The relatively lengthy document you have received accuses
you of “willfully and maliciously” violating the law and asks for an injunction
and damages in the hundreds of thousands, or even millions of dollars. It also
asks that you be made to pay “costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees” in an
unspecified amount. Now, you don’t have hundreds of thousands of dollars, let
alone millions. You don’t know any attorneys, except your second cousin in
Poughkeepsie.1 And, after reading the complaint, you realize that at least some
of it is true—you did do the basic things it says you did (sold certain
merchandise, used a certain name for your store, products, or services,
registered a particular domain name or domain names), although you do not
believe that you acted “willfully and maliciously.” Given all of that, you might
think it is just junk mail, a joke, or something else you should ignore.2 Or you
ignore it because you don’t know what else to do. If you wait long enough, the
sender likely will act—they will obtain an entry of default from the clerk of the
court,3 and will follow it up with a motion for a default judgment.4 At that
time, the court would find that you did “willfully and maliciously” infringe and
could award substantial damages. For cybersquatting, for example, the law
allows damages of $1,000 to $100,000 per domain name that you registered,
without any showing of actual damages.5 In addition, you may be compelled to
pay the plaintiff's attorneys’ fees. The Lanham Act allows for awards of

I mean no disrespect to Poughkeepsie—it’s just a literary device!
For an actual narrative, albeit in a copyright case, see Achte/Neunte Boll Kino Beteiligungs
Gmbh & Co. KG v. Plebaniak, No. 11-10268-PBS, 2013 WL 1342321 (D. Mass. Mar. 18, 2013).
Defendant, moving to set aside a default judgment, claimed that he thought letters demanding a
settlement payment “were a ‘scam,’ ” and that was why he did not respond to them or the
complaint. Id. at *3. Although the court denied the motion (partly because it viewed the motion
as untimely), the story is not entirely implausible.
3 See FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a). If you did not sign and return the acknowledgement of service,
you would be “served” in a more formal way, either by hand delivery or by some other method,
perhaps including mail. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d) (waiver of service); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e), F.R.C.P.
(service on an individual).
4 You may or may not receive notice of the motion, see FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2).
5 Lanham Act § 35(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d) (2012). See also id. § 1117(c) (for counterfeit
trademarks, statutory damages could be as high as $2 million per “mark per type of goods” if the
violation is willful; $1,000 to $200,000 if not).
1
2
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attorneys’ fees in “exceptional cases.”6 If the court finds your infringement to
be “willful,” it may conclude that the case is “exceptional.”7
This somewhat melodramatic narrative illustrates the general issue I propose
to address. Many trademark cases end with default judgments. Because of the
rules regarding defaults, allegations of willful conduct often are accepted with
little concrete evidence. Moreover, courts often find willfulness and an
exceptional case based on the default itself.8 Although default judgments serve
valid purposes, both in trademark law and in litigation generally, the easy
finding of willfulness, which greatly enhances potential liability, should be
exercised with caution. This Article examines findings of willfulness and
exceptionality in default cases in trademark law—and, for comparison, in some
copyright and patent cases. The Article expresses skepticism about the process
of making such findings in many cases, as well as about the disuniformity of
such findings. Thereafter, I propose some process guidelines for default cases
to properly balance the right of a trademark owner to an appropriate recovery
against the right of a defendant to not be harshly treated for the mere act of
defaulting. I also make some general observations about the manner in which
courts decide these cases.
I. DEFAULTS AND DEFAULT JUDGMENTS
Procedurally, default judgments in federal court are governed by Rule 55.9
Under Rule 55(a), if a defending party “fail[s] to plead or otherwise defend”10
the clerk must enter a default.11 This is not a judgment. Judgments are
Id. § 35(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
E.g., Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Juijiang Hison Motor Boat Co., No. 1:12-Civ.-20626, 2012 WL
2873733, at *14 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2012).
8 Id.; eAdgear, Inc. v. Liu, No. Civ.-11-05398 JCS, 2012 WL 2367805, at *19 (N.D. Cal. June
21, 2012); Coach, Inc. v. McMeins, No. 11 Civ. 3574 BSJJCF, 2012 WL 1071269, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 9, 2012) (awarding $800,000 damages).
9 FED. R. CIV. P. 55. Rule 37 also permits the entry of a default judgment if a party disobeys
discovery orders. Id. at 37(b)(2)(vi). In those cases, the disobedient party has appeared, usually
with an attorney, would have notice, and a default judgment would not raise all of the issues
discussed here. The issue of statutory damages, if relevant, and the wide range and discretion
afforded courts, would apply equally in such cases.
10 The phrase “otherwise defend” is not very limiting. Potentially, a very wide range of activity,
or inactivity, could fall into that phrase. See Sean T.H. Dutton, Rule 55 At Trial: The Default Rule is
Not Always Best, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 159, 160 (2012) (critiquing case law in some circuits that
permits default judgments to be entered when a party fails to appear for trial). The focus of this
Article is on cases where a party fails to plead—i.e., does not answer the complaint.
11 FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a).
6
7
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governed by Rule 55(b); a clerk may only enter a judgment “for a sum
certain.”12 Otherwise, a motion must be made to the court for a default
judgment.13 The court has discretion about the entry of the judgment and the
relief granted,14 although it is limited to the kind of relief requested by the
complaint and it cannot award more than the amount requested in the
complaint.15 The defendant is only required to receive notice of the hearing on
the motion for a default judgment if he or she “has appeared personally or by a
representative.”16 Appellate courts have set forth various factors to guide
district judges when deciding whether to enter default judgments.17 Moreover,
judges will accept the “well pleaded” allegations of the complaint as true—
conclusory allegations that would not suffice to raise plausible factual claims
need not be accepted.18 Although courts frequently hold hearings before
awarding damages, a court may decide the issue on the motion papers.19
II. WILLFULNESS AND THE LANHAM ACT
The Lanham Act uses the term “willful” in a number of places, although not
as an element of a trademark infringement claim. Trademark infringement does
not require fault or bad faith; demonstrating willful conduct is not necessary to
obtain an injunction.20 An injunction is the most common form of relief for

Id. § 55(b)(1).
Id. § 55(b)(2).
14 See, e.g., Coach, Inc. v. Ocean Point Gifts, No. 09-4215, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59003, at *14
(D.N.J. June 14, 2010). See also Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that
district court has discretion about whether to enter default judgment).
15 FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c). See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Toyo Enter. Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1092
(N.D. Cal. 2009).
16 FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2). If so, then seven days notice is required. Id.
17 See, e.g., Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986) (listing seven factors: “(1) the
possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the
sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a
dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the
strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.”).
18 E.g., Century 21 Real Estate, LLC v. Bercosa Corp., 666 F. Supp. 2d 274, 280–81 (E.D.N.Y.
2009); Levi Strauss & Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1097–98 (only an injunction sought).
19 E.g., Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir.
1997).
20 See J.T. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION (4th ed. 2014)
(intent not an element of trademark infringement). However, intent to confuse is not generally
considered irrelevant to the analysis of infringement. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the
Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1589–90 (2006) (noting that all
12
13
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trademark infringement,21 and default judgments commonly include such
relief.22 “Willful” conduct is used instead to enhance the relief available to
successful litigants beyond an injunction. Monetary relief generally is governed
by Section 35 of the Lanham Act,23 and it is this form of relief for which
willfulness is most relevant. Sometimes willfulness is judicially inserted into the
analysis even if the statute does not require it, while in other cases the statute
specifically refers to “willful” activity. Section 35(a) allows plaintiffs to recover
actual damages and/or defendant’s profits. Actual damages sustained by
plaintiff do not ordinarily require proof of willfulness.24 However, some
circuits require a showing of willfulness if defendant's profits are to be
recovered.25 In addition, Section 35(a) allows the court to enhance the
damages—up to three times actual damages or whatever amount is “just” if
profits are an inadequate measure. Courts tend to use willfulness as a factor in
deciding whether to enhance the damages even though the statute bars using
enhancement as a penalty.26 The sole mention of willfulness in Section 35(a) is
in reference to dilution; Section 35(a) applies only to “a willful violation under
section 1125(c) of this title” (i.e., Section 43(c)).27 Section 43(c), the dilution
provision of the Lanham Act, contains a very curious reference to willfulness.
Under Section 43(c)(5), damages in dilution cases are only available if defendant
“willfully intended to trade on the recognition of the famous mark” or “willfully

circuits but one include defendant’s intent in their multifactor test); id. at 1608–09, 1626–31
(showing that existence of intent is highly correlated to plaintiff winning an infringement suit).
21 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2012).
22 E.g., Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. JMD Entm’t Grp., LLC, 958 F. Supp. 2d 588, 596 (D. Md.
2013).
23 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2012).
24 Actual damages are provided by § 35(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)(2) (2012). As discussed
below, the one exception to this statement is where the relief is granted pursuant to the federal
dilution statute, which is § 43(c) of the Lanham Act. Damages for dilution require a showing of
willful conduct.
25 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 30:62 (discussing the approaches of the different circuits). See
Lanham Act § 35(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)(1). See also Purepacha Enters. v. El Matador Spices &
Dry Chilies, No. 11c 2569, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94522, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2013) (noting
that a default supports an award of defendant’s profits).
26 “Such sum in either of the above circumstances shall constitute compensation and not a
penalty.” Lanham Act § 35(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). See, e.g., Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos,
Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1127 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding willfulness relevant to enhancement but may
not be punitive), aff’d on other grounds, 505 U.S. 763 (1992); La Quinta Corp. v. Heartland
Properties, LLC, 603 F.3d 327, 345 (6th Cir. 2010).
27 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
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intended to harm the reputation of the famous mark.”28 This seeming
redundancy of “willful” and “intent” is not explained.
For specific types of infringement, Section 35 contains statutory damage
provisions (i.e., provisions allowing damage awards without any actual proof of
harm) and additional enhanced damage provisions. One such situation involves
counterfeit marks.29 Section 35(b) requires a trebling of damages or profits for
a knowing use of a counterfeit mark.30 If actual damages or defendant’s profits
cannot be shown—a real possibility if defendant does not appear—then Section
35(c) provides statutory damages for the use of counterfeit marks. Section
35(c)(1) gives a very wide range: $1,000 to $200,000 per mark per type of goods
sold “as the court considers just.”31 The ceiling increases from $200,000 to $2
million “if the court finds that the use of the counterfeit mark was willful.”32
If defendant violates the anti-cybersquatting provisions of Section 43(d)(1),
then statutory damages are available under Section 35(d). The permissible
amounts range from $1,000 to $100,000 per domain name;33 although not
specified in the statute, courts use willfulness as a factor in determining what
amount is “just.”34

Id. § 1125(c)(5)(B).
Id. § 1127 (a counterfeit mark is “a spurious mark which is identical with, or substantially
indistinguishable from [another’s registered trademark]”); id. (definition of “counterfeit”); id.
§ 1116(d)(1)(B)(ii) (also defining counterfeit). The definition only applies to registered marks.
30 § 35(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b)(1). But cf. Purepacha Enters. Inc. v. El Matador Spices & Dry
Chiles, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94522, at *12 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2013) (trebling damages is up to the
court’s discretion). Sometimes courts seem to overlook a key word in this provision: counterfeit.
Hockey Club of the Ohio Valley, LLC v. Eagle Mktg. Group, L.L.C., 2013 WL 6524719, at *3–4
(N.D. W. Va. Dec. 12, 2013) (in this case, there appears to be a counterfeit mark, but the court
did not mention this when discussing this provision).
31 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(1).
32 Id. § 1117(c)(2). There are courts that seem to have lost sight of the Lanham Act definition
of “counterfeit,” which makes a finding on a default even more problematic. Lane Crawford
LLC v. Kelex Trading (CA) Inc., 2013 WL 6481354, at *2 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2013) (citing
cases which did not appear to require an “identical or substantially indistinguishable” mark).
33 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d).
34 E.g., eAdGear, Inc. v. Liu, 2012 WL 2367805, at *18 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2012). But cf.
Facebook, Inc. v. Banana Ads LLC, 2013 WL 1873289, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2013)
(distinguishing eAdGear, stating that typosquatting is not as egregious as other forms of
cybersquatting, and awarding statutory damages in amounts ranging from $5,000 to $25,000 per
domain name, depending on the number of domains registered and “repeated cybersquatting”).
Like § 35(c), § 35(d) contains the phrase “as the court considers just.” Section 35(e) creates a
rebuttable presumption of willfulness—applicable to all of § 35—if the defendant knowingly
gives false contact information when registering or renewing a domain name. 15 U.S.C.
28
29
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Finally, Section 35(a) permits an award of attorneys’ fees “in exceptional
cases.”35 The determination of exceptionalism involves several factors, but
willful infringement is one of the key factors.36 There has been some
disagreement about whether electing statutory damages under Section 35(c) (for
counterfeits) precludes an award of attorneys’ fees under Section 35(a).37 The
Second Circuit has ruled that a plaintiff may be awarded both statutory damages
and attorneys’ fees.38
Thus, willfulness is an important aspect of trademark remedies, though not
of liability in general. But all of these statutory provisions lack a crucial
feature—a definition of “willful.” Is it any intentional conduct? That seems
too broad. It would turn almost any infringement suit into a willful
infringement, since defendants normally intend their own actions. Perhaps it is
conduct that reveals that the actor has knowledge of (or at least is reckless in
disregard of) the fact that one’s conduct violates the law? If the latter, then a
mere allegation of “willful” conduct in a complaint hardly demonstrates,
without more, that a defendant not only acted intentionally, but also with
knowledge of the act’s illegality. One court stated that “[w]illfulness requires a
connection between the defendant’s awareness of its competitors and the
defendant’s actions at those competitors’ expense.”39 Another court stated that
“willfulness required for a disgorgement award is the ‘intent to benefit from the
goodwill or reputation of the trademark holder.’ ”40 Neither of these seem to
require that defendant know that its actions are infringing, and the latter
formulation omits any reference to confusion. These distinctions may not
appear critical to the analysis, but in the case of counterfeits it can make a

§ 1117(e). However, unlike § 35(c) (or copyright’s 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)), § 35(d) does not contain
any specific damage enhancement for a willful violation of the anticybersquatting statute.
35 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
36 Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 108–09 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding
bad faith or willfulness is a requirement for attorneys’ fees). Accord, Mister Softee of Brooklyn,
Inc. v. Boula Vending Inc., 484 F. App’x 623, 624 (2d Cir. 2012) (upholding denial of fees).
37 See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A., 676 F.3d at 106–07 (citing cases). The Ninth Circuit
declined to rule on the issue in a case holding that electing Section 35(c) damages precluded an
automatic award of attorneys’ fees under Section 35(b). K & N Eng’g v. Bulat, 510 F.3d 1079,
1082 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2007).
38 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A., 676 F.3d at 108–11. Presumably, this holding would apply
equally to claims for cybersquatting, where statutory damages are sought under Section 35(d).
39 Coach, Inc. v. Sexy Fashion, No. Civ. 12-05713 RSWL (SSx), 2013 WL 3233393, at *2 (C.D.
Cal. June 25, 2013).
40 Klein-Becker USA, LLC v. Englert, 711 F.3d 1153, 1162 (10th Cir. 2013), quoting W.
Diversified Servs., Inc. v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., 427 F.3d 1269, 1273–74 (10th Cir. 2005).
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significant difference. One may knowingly sell counterfeits without any intent
to confuse customers (as does a web site called goodcounterfeitsgalore.com41).
Some courts are more careful about defining willfulness. In Ashland v.
Randolph,42 the court said that “ ‘[W]illfulness’ means more than simply that the
act of infringement was done voluntarily and intentionally and not because of
accident or other innocent reason.”43 Although not a model of clarity, it
appears the court is conveying the sense that the intent must be to violate the
law, not just to do the act that is infringing.
If, as discussed below, the pleadings are a determining factor for willfulness,
then we will need a better explication of the meaning of willfulness. To state a
plausible claim of willful infringement should require facts, not simply a bare
allegation of willful conduct.44 To judge a pleading properly, especially in a
default—where the pleading is the primary source of facts, we should have a
common understanding of the key terms—particularly willfulness.
III. DEFAULTS AND WILLFULNESS
Default judgments in trademark law are not uncommon, particularly in cases
involving counterfeits or cybersquatting.45 The crucial question is how courts
analyze willfulness in default cases. The answer is that default judgments and
41 See Chanel, Inc. v. Dudum, 2012 WL 5833562, at *4 & n.5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2012) (sellers
told buyers that the goods were not genuine). A court might decide that this is evidence of an
intent to cause post-sale confusion. Id. But that looks more like a rationalization for imposing a
penalty for selling counterfeits than a thoughtful analysis of the statute.
42 No. 3:13-21768, 2013 WL 5777172 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 25, 2013).
43 Id. at *5 (quoting In re Outsidewall Tire Litig., 748 F. Supp. 2d 557, 562 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(emphasis added)).
44 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (bare conclusions not sufficient to satisfy Rule 8).
Although FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b), allows intent to be pleaded generally, Iqbal seems to require that there
be sufficient facts from which to draw an inference of willfulness.
45 The numbers appear to have increased significantly over the last ten years. A Westlaw
search of (lanham or trademark) /p “default judgment” in the ALLFEDS database, with yearly
date restrictions, yielded only 18 results in 2005 (not all of which were actually default judgments).
In 2006, the search yielded 51 results, in 2008, 103 results, and in 2011, 159 results. In 2013 there
were 128 results, and, as of the end of February, 2014, there were 22 results for 2014. I should
note that the same search on Lexis produces a different number of results. For example, in 2005,
Lexis reports thirty-five results, not eighteen. For the numerical comparisons among different
years, I have used Westlaw results in this paper, recognizing that there will be discrepancies in the
data. However, some of the cases discussed here are only available on Lexis. It should be further
noted that some of the search results are not pertinent and many of the cases show up twice in
the results—once when a magistrate judge issues a recommendation, and again when the district
judge is asked to confirm (or modify) that recommendation.
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findings of willfulness almost go hand in hand in trademark cases. Moreover,
courts reach these results without requiring much, if any, proof from the
plaintiff on this issue. They use two precepts, either singly or in combination.
First, many complaints allege that the defendant acted willfully. Courts
frequently find that by defaulting defendant has admitted the allegations of
willful conduct.46 Second, courts often state that willfulness may be inferred
from the act of defaulting.47 This is particularly true in cases alleging trademark
counterfeiting. As an example, consider Coach, Inc. v. McMeins.48 The complaint
alleged that defendant sold counterfeit Coach merchandise through a website.49
Coach purchased one item for $74.98 (which the website stated had a retail
value of $259.95), which Coach determined was counterfeit.50 The court recited
a statement often repeated in default cases: “[f]ollowing a default, all factual
allegations of the complaint, except those relating to damages, must be accepted
as true.”51 The court then found that Coach’s allegations sufficiently
demonstrated ownership of a valid mark and likelihood of confusion.52
Subsequently, the court stated that “the defendant’s failure to appear and
defend permits an inference that he was willful in infringing upon the
trademarks,”53 and that therefore “an award of statutory damages under
§ 1117(c)(2) is appropriate.”54 Willfulness was further relevant in that a willful
infringement permits a statutory award that includes “a punitive component to
discourage further wrongdoing.”55 Although there was no evidence introduced
about defendant’s actual sales, the court posited that at $259.95 retail, a sale of
four thousand items would equal more than $1 million.56 The court awarded
46 E.g., American Automobile Ass’n v. Dickerson, 2014 WL 234362, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 22,
2014); U.S.A. Famous Original Ray’s Licensing Corp., 2013 WL 5363777, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
26, 2013); Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Lynch, 2013 WL 2897939, at *5 (M.D. Fla. June 12, 2013).
47 E.g., Coach, Inc. v. Sexy Fashion, 2013 WL 3233393, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2013); Coach,
Inc. v. McMeins, 2012 WL 1071269, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2012) (magistrate judge
recommendation).
48 No. 11 Civ. 3574 (BSJ) (JCF), 2012 WL 1071269 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2012) (magistrate judge
recommendation).
49 Id. at *1.
50 Id. at *2.
51 Id. at *3 (citations omitted).
52 Id.
53 Id. (citations omitted). Accord, Petmed Express, Inc. v. Medpets.com, 336 F. Supp. 2d 1213,
1220 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
54 2012 WL 1071269, at *3.
55 Id. (quoting All-Star Mktg. Grp., LLC v. Media Brands Co., 775 F. Supp. 2d 613, 622
(S.D.N.Y. 2011)).
56 Id. at *4.
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$800,000 in statutory damages (representing $200,000 per infringing mark), and
again cited defendant’s willfulness in support of a large award.57
A similar situation exists in cybersquatting cases. Although the statute does
not mention willful conduct, courts consider it as a factor when determining
statutory damages, and it is a prime factor when assessing requests for
attorneys’ fees. Thus, in Wecosign, Inc. v. IFG Holdings, Inc.,58 the court entered a
default judgment on various claims, including trademark infringement and
cyberpiracy. On the latter claim, the court’s statutory damage award included
consideration of defendant’s willfulness.59 Furthermore, the court awarded
attorneys’ fees, stating that “Plaintiff alleged that Defendants’ acts were ‘willful
and deliberate.’ ”60
Similarly, in eAdgear, Inc. v. Liu,61 the court deemed defendant’s acts to be
willful by virtue of its default.62 On the cybersquatting claim, the court awarded
the maximum allowed, citing willfulness.63 The court also awarded attorneys'
fees, again finding willfulness based on default.64
In Citigroup, Inc. v. Malik,65 the court found defaulting defendants liable for
cybersquatting and, based on the finding of a bad faith intent to profit (a
necessary element of cybersquatting under Section 43(d)), found the case to be
“exceptional” and recommended an award of attorneys’ fees.66 In Hertz Corp. v.
Hertz Auto Transport,67 the court found defendants (all of whom defaulted) liable
for infringement, dilution, and cybersquatting, and found the case exceptional,
but without explanation in the reported opinion.68
In counterfeiting and cybersquatting cases, findings of willfulness are doubly
penalized. First, where statutory damages are sought in counterfeiting cases,
willfulness dramatically increases the size of the potential damages award.69 As
57 Id. See Philip Morris, USA, Inc. v. Escandon, No. Civ. S-05-1337 WBS DAD, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26766, at *6–12 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2005) (granting statutory damages and attorneys’ fees).
58 845 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
59 Id. at 1086.
60 Id. (emphasis added). Accord, CrossFit, Inc. v. Jenkins, 2014 WL 4706066, at *8 (D. Colo.
Sept. 22, 2014) (granting $100,000 statutory damages).
61 No. Civ.-11-05398JCS, 2012 WL 2367805 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2012).
62 Id. at *19.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 No. 1:07Civ.1168, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126676 (E.D. Va. June 16, 2009).
66 Id. at *24. The magistrate also recommended awarding statutory damages of $200,000.
67 No. 09-23476-CIV, 2010 WL 5151625 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 2010).
68 Id. at *4.
69 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(2) (2012) (increasing maximum statutory damages for counterfeiting
from $200,000 per mark to $2,000,000 per mark). See Chanel, Inc. v. 7perfecthandbags.com, No.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol22/iss1/5

10

Welkowitz: Fault Lines in Trademark Default Judgments

2014]

FAULT LINES IN TRADEMARK DEFAULT JUDGMENTS 111

noted above, courts also consider willful conduct a reason to enhance statutory
awards in cybersquatting cases.70 Statutory damages are commonly requested in
counterfeiting and cybersquatting cases, and courts frequently grant them as
part of default judgments (though not usually at the statutory maxima), often
while noting that defaults are the archetypical case for which such damages are
appropriate.71 These cases represent a significant percentage of default
judgments.72 Second, as discussed below, willfulness supports an award of
attorneys’ fees.73
But findings of willfulness are not limited to cases of counterfeiting or
cybersquatting. Other cases have found defaulting defendants to have admitted
allegations of willful conduct in the complaint which warranted awards of
attorneys’ fees or enhanced damages.74

12-22057-CIV, 2014 WL 352197, at *7 n.6 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2014) (taking willfulness into
account); Stark Carpet Corp. v. Stark Carpet & Flooring Installations Corp., 954 F. Supp. 2d 145,
156 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing cases giving large awards for willful infringement); eAdGear, Inc. v.
Liu, No. Civ.-11-05398 OCS, 2012 WL 2367805, at *19 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2012) (citing cases
indicating that willful conduct makes larger damage awards more likely); Citigroup, Inc. v. Malik,
No. 1:07Civ.1168, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126676, at *24–25 (E.D. Va. June 16, 2009) (awarding
$200,000 for two domains with a finding of willfulness).
70 See Coach, Inc. v. McMeins, 2012 WL 1071269; Wecosign, Inc. v. IFG Holdings, 845 F.
Supp. 2d 1072; dAdgear, Inc. v. Liu, 2012 WL 6484354.
71 E.g., Citigroup, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126676; Tiffany (NJ), LLC v. Dongping, No. 1061214-CIV, 2010 WL 4450451, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2010); Rolex Watch USA, Inc. v. Aulov,
Civ.10-3547 (DLI) (VV), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99531, at *15–16 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2011);
Coach, Inc. v. Melendez, No. 10 Civ. 6178 (BSJ) (HBP), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116842 at *18–19
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011); WFTV, Inc. v. Maverik Prod. LLC, No. 6:11-Civ.-1923-ORL-28KRS,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86137, at *35–36 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2013) (statutory damages used to
punish wrongful conduct); Estate of Mercer K. Ellington v. Harbrew Imports, Ltd., 812 F. Supp.
2d 186, 192–93 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (court grants counterfeit statutory damages though no indication
of a claim for counterfeiting). See also Hertz Corp., 2010 WL 5151625, at *4 (awarding $200,000).
72 In 2006, nine of the fifty-one reported results had a statutory damage award, or just under
20%. (I am including all of the reported results for each year. As noted earlier, not all of the
cases are actually default judgments and some cases may be reported twice.) In 2007, twenty-six
of sixty-six cases had statutory damage awards, or more than one-third. In 2008, just under 30%
(30 of 103) had such awards, and in 2011, 47 of 159, or 30%. In 2011, attorneys’ fees were also
awarded in half of the reported cases, 80 out of 159.
73 See infra notes 74–86 and accompanying text.
74 E.g., Coach, Inc. v. Chouman’s Ass’n, 2012 WL 6705412, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 26, 2012)
(default admits allegations of willfulness and supports award of attorneys’ fees). In 2005, in all
three cases in which statutory damages were awarded attorneys’ fees followed (plus one additional
case granted attorneys’ fees). In 2008, attorneys’ fees were awarded in 40 of 103 cases (no fees
were sought in twenty of the cases), and in 2011, attorneys’ fees were awarded in 80 of 159 cases
(no fees were sought in twenty-six of the cases).
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A useful example is BMW of N. Am., LLC v. Mini Coupe Haw.75 Defendant
sold and rented three-wheeled vehicles it called “MiniCoupes”; BMW claimed
that this infringed and diluted its MINI marks for cars.76 Although BMW did
not seek monetary damages, it did seek attorneys’ fees. The court found the
case to be “exceptional” and warranting a fee award, stating that “[c]ases are
also exceptional where a defendant has defaulted or otherwise failed to
appear.”77
In Guishan, Inc. v. Faith Ice, Inc.,78 plaintiff sued various defendants alleging
that they used plaintiff’s Mr. Softee trademark and/or trade dress in various
places in New York.79 The court initially noted that by defaulting, “defendants
[are] deemed to have admitted all of the well pleaded allegations pertaining to
liability.”80 With respect to attorneys’ fees, the court did not just cite the usual
standard of “fraud, bad faith, or willful infringement,”81 but noted that the
award is discretionary “even with a finding of bad faith.”82 The magistrate did
recommend fee awards against those defendants deemed to have infringed
plaintiff’s trademarks, but recommended considerably less than the fee
request.83 The plaintiffs, however, objected to the magistrate’s report in part
and the district judge granted an injunction against other defendants based on

75 No. 12-00331 OMS KSC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30696 (D. Haw. Feb. 13, 2013),
recommendation adopted, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30639 (D. Haw. Mar. 5, 2013).
76 BMW also claimed that defendant’s web domain, minicoupehawaii.com, was infringing.
However, no claim was brought for cybersquatting.
77 No. 12-00331 OMS KSC, at *19 (citation omitted). Accord, Coach, Inc. v. Sac a Main, No.
1:12-Civ.-00840-LJ)-SMS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159907, at *18 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2012) (in
default judgment case, awarding attorneys’ fees because the complaint alleged willful and
malicious conduct); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Escandon, No. Civ. S-05-1337, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26766, at *11–12 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2005) (default makes case exceptional). See Rio
Properties, Inc. v. Rio International Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1023 (9th Cir. 2002) (default accepts
complaint’s allegations of willful and malicious conduct, making the case exceptional); Derek
Andrew, Inc. v. Poof Apparel Corp., 528 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2008) (same, citing Rio).
78 No. 08Civ.2407 (DLI) (RMC), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126146 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2009)
(magistrate judge recommendation).
79 Id. at *4.
80 Id. at *2 (citations omitted). However, the court refused to enter an injunction (or grant a fee
award) against some of the defaulting defendants who, in the court’s estimation, had not been
shown by evidence—largely photographs—to have committed trademark infringement. Id. at *9–10.
81 Id. at *14.
82 Id.
83 Id. at *15–28.
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their default (i.e., their default constituted admissions of infringing activity)84
and increased the fee award.85
Many other cases have also awarded attorneys’ fees based on defendant’s
deemed admission of allegations of willfulness.86
There are occasional courts that appear to recognize more or less explicitly
that a default by itself should not be equated with bad faith.87 Even then,
however, the default may lead to the same end if the court accepts as true
allegations of willfulness in the complaint.88

84 Guishan, Inc. v. Faith Ice, Inc., No. 08-Civ.-2407 (DLI) (RMC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26830, at *6–10 (E.D.N.Y Mar. 22, 2010).
85 Id. at *10–12.
86 E.g., Blowbar, Inc. v. Blow Bar Salon Inc., No. 8:13-v-1430=T-17EAJ, 2013 WL 6244531, at
*3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 2013); AARP v. Sycle, 991 F. Supp. 2d 224, 234 (D.D.C. Nov. 27, 2013) (an
admission of allegations of willfulness equates to an exceptional case, even where the court
refused statutory damages based on inadequate support in the record); Unilever Supply Chain,
Inc. v. I & I Wholesale Food, Inc., 10-Civ.-1077 (RJD) (RER), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30661, at
*6–7, *19 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2011), citing Louis Vuitton Malletier v. WhenU.com, Inc., No. 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97550, 2007 WL 25717, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2007) (admission by default
supports an attorneys’ fee award); Protection One Alarm Monitoring, Inc. v. Exec. Prot. One Sec.
Serv., LLC, 553 F. Supp. 2d 201, 207–08 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (default admits willfulness and makes
the case exceptional), citing Tiffany (NJ), Inc. v. Luban, 282 F. Supp. 2d 123, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2003),
and Fallaci v. New Gazette Literary Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1172, 1173 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); 99¢ Only
Stores v. 99¢ Store, No. Civ.-09-0440 CBM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131649, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct.
9, 2009) (judge reduced the fee request); see Beautybank, Inc. v. Harvey Prince, LLP, No. 10 Civ.
955 (DAB) (GWG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17932, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2011) (default
admits allegation of willful infringement regarding profits), citing Louis Vuitton Malletier v.
Carducci Leather Fashions, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 2d 501, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Gen. Nutrition Inv.
Co. v. Gen. Vitamin Ctrs., 817 F. Supp. 2d 66, 74–75 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (also citing defendant’s
failure to respond to plaintiff’s earlier inquiries); Mr. Softee, Inc. v. Awawda, Civ. 11-01632-PHXFJM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149822, at *5–6 (D. Ariz. Dec. 29, 2011) (attorneys’ fees awarded
because complaint alleges willful conduct).
87 Coach, Inc. v. Just a Boun, LLC, No. 6:11-Civ.-797-ORL-18GJK, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
144582, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 2011) (“A party’s default alone is not an exceptional
circumstance.”); Doehrer v. Caldwell, 127 U.S.P.Q. 391 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (default does not
establish willfulness); see Century 21 Real Estate, LLC v. Bercosa Corp., 666 F. Supp. 2d 274, 290
n.10 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). Copyright cases raise similar concerns because of the statutory damages
provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012). Although many copyright cases are decided in a fashion
similar to trademark cases—i.e., accepting willfulness allegations at face value—one can find
exceptions in copyright decisions as well. E.g., AF Holdings, LLC v. Bossard, No. 1:12-Civ.1101, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143055, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2013) (in a copyright default
case, expressing concern about finding willfulness based on “simple conclusory assertions of
willful conduct” in the complaint).
88 Just a Boun, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144582, at *12–13.
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These cases illustrate the key problems. First, by defaulting, defendants are
deemed to admit the allegations relating to liability, including allegations of
willful infringement. Second, and more troubling, in many cases courts state
that the default itself is a basis for finding bad faith and/or willfulness.89 These
findings pertain both to damages and attorneys’ fees; sometimes, the default
alone is found sufficient to make a case exceptional.90 Whatever the
justification for accepting the complaint’s allegations of willfulness, this cannot
be transferred to the act of default.91 This is particularly problematic where the
complaint itself does not allege willful conduct or does so in a conclusory
fashion. In those situations, the defendant would have no reasonable basis to
believe that the act of defaulting would lead to such a finding.
These cases also illustrate the recurring theme—and difficult issue—that
underlies default judgments. The fact of default is used to impose a substantial
damage award and attorneys’ fees without forcing plaintiffs to submit
significant evidence to support the awards (although they do frequently have
evidence, especially in counterfeiting cases). Statutory damages are intended to
allow plaintiffs to recover damages where Congress has determined that
plaintiff should be able to recover notwithstanding the difficulties of proving
harm. And counterfeiters that default clearly make it difficult for plaintiffs to
demonstrate damages such as lost profits. Nevertheless, there are also cases

89 Krevat v. Burgers to Go, Inc., 2014 WL 4638844, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014); Unilever
Supply Chain, Inc. v. I & I Wholesale Food, Inc., 10-Civ.-1077(RJD) (RER), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 30661, at *6–7, *19 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2011), citing Louis Vuitton Malletier v.
WhenU.com, Inc., 05 Civ. 1325 (LAN)(DFE), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97550, 2007 WL 257717, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2007); Four Green Fields Holdings, LLC v. Four Green Fields, No. 8:10Civ.-3800-5 (TEA), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126707, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2011), citing
Franchise Co. v. Express Corporate Apparel, LLC, 2011 WL 1226002, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 28,
2011); Taylor Made Golf Co. v. Carsten Sports, Ltd., 175 F.R.D. 658, 663 (S.D. Cal. 1997);
Tiffany (NJ), Inc. v. Luban, 282 F. Supp. 2d 123, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“By virtue of the default,
the Lubans’ infringement is deemed willful . . . .”); Gucci America, Inc. v. Myreplicahandbag.com,
No. 07 Civ. 2438(JGK), 2008 WL 512789, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2008) (counterfeits). But see
Coach, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144582, at *12 (“A party’s default alone is not an exceptional
circumstance.”). However, in Just a Boun, the court deemed allegations of willfulness in the
complaint admitted by default. Id. at *12–13.
90 E.g., BMW of N. Am., LLC v. Quality Star Benzz LLC, No. 2:12-Civ.-00889-GMN-VLF,
2013 WL 6451854, at *1 (D. Nev. Dec. 9, 2013). See Lane Crawford LLC v. Kelex Trading (CA)
Inc., No. 12 Civ. 9190(GBD) (AJP), 2013 WL 6481354, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2013).
91 See, e.g., Bandana Co. v. RJEJ Inv. LLC, No. 3:12-Civ.-00846-TBR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
119820, at *10 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 23, 2013) (in a copyright case, refusing to find defendant’s actions
willful due to its default, despite acknowledging precedent to support such a finding).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol22/iss1/5

14

Welkowitz: Fault Lines in Trademark Default Judgments

2014]

FAULT LINES IN TRADEMARK DEFAULT JUDGMENTS 115

where a large damage award is clearly speculative and primarily punitive and
where the defendant is not a renegade, or if she is, is a very small-time renegade.
Thus, there is a conundrum in the finding of willfulness and bad conduct
from the fact of a default. Defendants may default for a number of reasons.
Some of the reasons, such as obstreperous litigation tactics, or a defendant’s
desire to escape justice, deserve judicial condemnation. But in other cases
defendants may default either because they don’t really understand the
consequences of a default or because they do not have the resources to hire a
lawyer.92 Apart from the punitive statutory damages, the court’s imposition of
attorneys’ fees on defaulting defendants in effect turns what should be a remedy
for the most egregious cases—“exceptional” ones—into a virtual fee shifting
statute whenever defendant defaults. Moreover, forcing a defendant to engage
a lawyer to avoid imposition of fees may backfire in terms of the expenditure of
judicial resources. Once an attorney is engaged, it undoubtedly results in greater
litigation expense for both sides, with no guarantee that, for the defendant, the
result will be better. So the defendant may end up with a larger bill for
plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees because he or she engaged an attorney. And what if
defendant consults an attorney who tells her that she is likely to lose? Should
she be forced to litigate (perhaps in contravention of Rule 11) in order to avoid
an automatic finding of willfulness?93
This conundrum is caused by the very crude regime of default judgments. A
default effectively admits the complaint, leaving defendant little room to effect a
settlement. The current system, however, does not readily discriminate between
those defaulters seeking to escape proper condemnation and those who lack the
resources to litigate the claims.
92 If they don’t have insurance, they would have to pay by the hour which adds up quickly.
For an example of a situation in which an attorney would be important to one’s understanding of
the complaint, see Century 21 Real Estate, LLC v. Bercosa Corp., 666 F. Supp. 2d 274 (E.D.N.Y.
2009). The case involved a franchisee who continued to use the mark after the franchise ended.
Although the mark used was described by the court as “genuine,” it also fit the statutory
definition of a counterfeit mark. Id. at 290. This is not something that would be obvious to a
person with no background in trademark law.
93 Answering the complaint, admitting liability while denying allegations of willfulness, as well
as allegations of damages, is a possible tactic. But it is an unlikely tactic for someone lacking an
attorneys’ advice. In one case, a corporation and its principal owner were sued as joint
defendants. The corporation defaulted, but the individual defendant appeared pro se. The court
found the corporation’s default to be evidence of willful conduct, despite the principal’s
appearance. Krevat v. Burgers to Go, Inc., No. 13–Civ.–6258(JS)(AKT), 2014 WL 4638844, at
*6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014). Since the principal appeared pro se (and corporations cannot appear
without counsel) it is very possible that the principal did not understand the consequences of
allowing the corporation to default while he defended.
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Even if the bare default is not used to infer willfulness, accepting the
complaint’s allegations of willfulness as true, for purposes of imposing higher
damages or awarding fees is highly questionable as a matter of legal process.94
Two related principles are axiomatic (at least if one believes the case citations)
when dealing with defaults: (1) a default admits the well-pleaded allegations of
the complaint as to liability.95 (2) Allegations as to damages, however, are not
deemed admitted, which explains why a hearing is required by Rule 55(b)(2).96
In the normal infringement case (including cases of counterfeiting), a showing
of willfulness is not a necessary element. Thus, accepting as true allegations of
willfulness that relate to the potential damage award (and fee award) would
conflict with the second principle. Yet most courts do not even perceive the
anomaly and accept as true allegations of willful conduct used solely to justify
awards of damages—especially statutory damages—and awards of attorneys’
fees.97
One might argue that, at least in some cases, willfulness is relevant to the
issues of liability, not just damages. Cybersquatting, for example, requires a
“bad faith intent to profit” from registering, trafficking in, or using domain
names that are confusingly similar to plaintiff’s mark.98 Thus, in order to

94 E.g., AF Holdings LLC v. Bossard, 976 F. Supp. 2d 927, 930 (W.D. Mich. 2013) (in a
copyright default case, expressing concern about finding willfulness based on “simple conclusory
assertions of willful conduct” in the complaint).
95 Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (securities case). Only those
allegations that would satisfy the pleading standards set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009),
and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), will be accepted. A complaint must state a
proper cause of action for the defaulting defendant to be held liable. See N.V.E., Inc. v. Felice, No.
09-2053(WJM), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121083, at *5–6 (D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2010) (denying judgment
against one defendant where the complaint did not state a proper claim against him); Crescent
Servs., Inc. v. Mich. Vacuum Trucks, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 2d 425, 428 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).
96 Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560. Technically, it has been held that a formal hearing is not required,
as long as the plaintiff presents evidence in its motion papers sufficient to support a damages
award. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 10A (4th ed. 1993 & Supps. 1984–1997); Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency v. Ace Shipping
Corp., 109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1997). But this does not alter the fact that plaintiff must offer
evidence outside of the complaint to support an award of actual damages.
97 One unusual example of a court that saw the conflict is Century 21 Real Estate, LLC v. Bercosa
Corp., 666 F. Supp. 2d 274 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). The magistrate judge called decisions that ruled that
defaults support willfulness in damages claims “in tension with the general rule that a default
suffices to establish the allegations in a pleading that relates to liability but not those that relate to
damages.” Id. at 290 n.10. The district judge subsequently adopted the magistrate’s report in full.
Id. at 278.
98 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i), (B).
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demonstrate liability, bad faith must be shown.99 However, the statutory
damages provision for cybersquatting does not expressly authorize additional
damages for willful conduct although such conduct is taken into account by
courts.100
Counterfeiting is less amenable to a deemed admission of willfulness. There
is not a separate action per se for counterfeiting, in the same manner as for
cybersquatting, with operative elements of a claim clearly spelled out. Section
34(d) of the Lanham Act,101 titled “Civil actions arising out of use of counterfeit
marks,” describes a remedy—seizure of goods and records—for an
infringement of a registered mark (that is, a demonstration of likelihood of
confusion) by use of a counterfeit. The term “counterfeit mark” is defined
(though not very well) by Sections 34(d)(1)(B) and 45.102 Thus, one could claim
that there is a separately defined, if limited, cause of action for counterfeiting.
But Section 34(d) does not require any sort of bad faith or willful conduct and,
in any event, it is more of a remedial section than an operative one. Sections
35(b) and (c) also provide special remedies for counterfeiting.103 Both of these
sections refer to intent or willful conduct. Section 35(b) requires trebling of
actual damages for intentional use of a counterfeit mark.104 Section 35(c)
provides statutory damages for counterfeits. Neither intent nor willful conduct
is required for statutory damages under Section 35(c), but Section 35(c)(2)
increases the ceiling of potential damages by a factor of ten if the use was
willful.105 Again, Section 35(c)(2) is a remedial section, not an operative section.
Therefore, its requirements are not elements of a claim but enhancements of
remedies. Counterfeiting is a subset of ordinary infringement; the elements are
the same; it is the characteristics of the infringing mark—identical or nearly
identical to the infringed mark—that make it counterfeiting. Willful or

99 Bad faith intent to profit is not necessarily the same as willfulness, if willfulness means
knowledge that the conduct violates the law. One may have a bad faith intent to profit without
knowing that acting on that intent violates trademark law.
100 See supra text accompanying notes 58–68.
101 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d).
102 Id. § 1116(d)(1)(B); id. § 1127 (definition of “counterfeit”). To some degree § 34(d)(1)(B) is
completely circular; in certain instances, however, it defines a counterfeit in the same way as
§ 45—as a “spurious” mark essentially “identical” to the registered one.
103 Id. § 1117(b), (c).
104 Id. § 1117(b).
105 Id. § 1117(c)(2).
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intentional conduct does not define counterfeiting; it just enhances the
remedies.106
With respect to cybersquatting, although “bad faith” of some sort is an
element of the claim, it is far from clear that Congress intended the “bad faith”
element of cybersquatting to be sufficient to award attorneys’ fees. If Congress
had so intended, it would have made more sense to include an attorneys’ fees
provision in Section 35(d), along with the statutory damages provision.
However, courts frequently award attorneys’ fees while seeming to assume that
“bad faith intent to profit” satisfies the requirements of an exceptional case.107
Even if we concede that many of the default judgments involve
counterfeiters (or sellers of counterfeit goods) who should be punished, the
process by which significant damages are imposed in defaults is less than
Finding willfulness—not an element of the claim for
desirable.108
counterfeiting—because of the default alone or because of a deemed admission,
and using that finding to impose substantial penalties without requiring much
(or any) proof on the part of the plaintiff seems unfair. The unfairness is
compounded by the fact that statutory damages are subject to so few limits.
Yet, if we require plaintiffs to demonstrate willfulness, we must ask what would
constitute sufficient evidence in the default context. There is also a need to
strike a balance between fairness to the defendant and fairness to a plaintiff
who may have a legitimate claim of right. In many cases, the plaintiff has sent a
cease and desist letter, and courts point to defendant’s continued use after

106 Also, “willful” may be a mixed question of fact and law, then deeming it admitted from a
conclusory allegation in a complaint is inappropriate; there should be additional facts that lead to
the conclusion of willful conduct. (Of course, if the complaint is sufficiently detailed, then the
predicate facts could be deemed admitted, unless one limits admissions to facts directly related to
liability and not remedies.)
107 See, e.g., PetMed Express, Inc. v. MedPets.com, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1222 (S.D. Fla.
2004) (citing, inter alia, defendants’ willful registration of the offending domain names); Rolex
Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Mills, No. 3:12-Civ.-000G1-L, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167008, at *12 (N.D.
Tex. Nov. 26, 2012) (“The court has already held that Defendants acted with bad faith intent and
therefore concludes that this is an exceptional case.”); see also Boyd Gaming Corp. v. King Zulu,
LLC, No. 2:12-Civ.-16 JCM(CWH), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153347, at *9 (D. Nev. Oct. 25, 2012)
(awarding attorneys’ fees without explanation).
108 In fairness, courts do not blindly give large damage awards. See AARP v. Sycle, 991 F. Supp.
2d 224, 232–34 (D.D.C. Nov. 27, 2013) (refusing to award statutory damages where plaintiff gave
no record basis for it, but allowing plaintiff additional time to produce a basis); see also Chanel,
Inc. v. Yang, No. C12-4428 PJH, 2013 WL 5755217, at *12–13 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2013)
(granting statutory damages for counterfeiting but refusing to award damages for cybersquatting
in light of the counterfeiting award).
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receiving such letters as evidence of willfulness.109 But is a cease and desist
letter sufficient? It is, after all, only the plaintiff’s claim of right. And
experience with takedown notices under the copyright law does not inspire
confidence that rights owners will act responsibly when asserting their rights.110
The default judgment opinions reinforce this concern. Trademark owners
frequently ask for maximum, or very large, statutory damage awards (which are
often reduced by courts).111 If trademark owners want the added benefit of
significantly higher damage awards, is it too much to ask for more proof than a
cease and desist letter?112
IV. DEFAULT, WILLFULNESS, AND BANKRUPTCY
One might argue that we should not be overly concerned with large damage
awards in default cases. At least in some cases, they serve a valid deterrent
function, especially for those who might edge close to the line of infringement
109 E.g., Boost Worldwide, Inc. v. Cell Station Wireless, Inc., No. 2:13-Civ.-490, 2014 WL
47977, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 17, 2014); WFTV, Inc. v. Maverik Prod., LLC, No. 6:11-Civ.-1923ORL-28KRS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86137, at *36 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2013); Rutt’s Hut, Inc. v.
Mutt’s Hut Int’l, No. 11-1350 (SRC), 2011 WL 2923697, at *1–2 (D.N.J. July 18, 2011). See
Hockey Club of the Ohio Valley, LLC v. Eagle Mktg. Grp., L.L.C., No. 5:12 Civ.161, 2013 WL
6524719, at *4 (N.D. W. Va. Dec. 12, 2013) (cease and desist letter among the pieces of
evidence).
110 See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Form v. Content in DMCA Notices, REBECCA TUSHNET’S 43(B)log
(Mar. 11, 2014, 9:32 AM), http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2014/03/form-v-content-in-dmca-notic
es.html. The problems of misuse of cease and desist letters are discussed in Leah Chan Grinvald,
Policing the Cease-and-Desist Letter, 49 U.S.F. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 14-32),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2115455.
111 E.g., Bentley Motors Ltd. Corp. v. McEntegart, No. 8:12-Civ.-1582-T-33TBM, 2014 WL
408375, at *4–6 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2014) (requesting $1 million statutory damages; award was
$500,000); Coach, Inc. v. Paula’s Store Sportswear, LLC, No. 13-3263 (SRC), 2014 WL 347893, at
*3–4 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2014) (requesting $800,000 statutory damages, awarded $80,000); Chanel,
Inc. v. The P’ship or Unincorporated Ass’n, No. 1:12-Civ.-22745, 2014 WL 352208, at *6–7 (S.D.
Fla. Jan. 31, 2014) (requesting $2 million per counterfeit mark; awarded $18,000 per mark); Hsiao
& Montano, Inc. v. Zhang, No. 2:13-Civ.-00493 ODW (VBxx), 2013 WL 3872207, at *4–5 (C.D.
Cal. July 24, 2013) (requesting $2 million per mark for counterfeiting; awarded $250,000 per mark;
requesting $100,000 per domain name for cybersquatting, awarded $3,000 per domain name);
Coach, Inc. v. Sexy Fashion, No. Civ. 12-05713 RSWL (SSx), 2013 WL 3233393, at *2–3 (C.D.
Cal. June 24, 2013) (requesting $100,000; awarding $40,000, with the court citing several cases in
which Coach was awarded much less than its request).
112 To illustrate the frequency of findings of willfulness after default. See supra table in the
Appendix, which gives details for 2012 and 2013. As can be seen, where courts discuss the issue
(and frequently the issue does not arise—either because it is deferred or, possibly, because the
plaintiff does not seek damages or attorneys’ fees) a finding of willfulness almost always follows.
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and those who then cross it unintentionally. Trademark owners certainly would
like to keep unauthorized users away from that line.113 Moreover, if a court
awards what a defendant believes are excessive damages, a defendant could
move to reopen the judgment under Rule 60(b).114 But Rule 60(b) is not
automatic; a defendant would have to present a very good reason for not
responding to the complaint in the first place in order to succeed.115 Still, one
might further say that even a defendant who is saddled with a large damages
payment could declare bankruptcy and seek to have the judgment debt
discharged. That route, however, contains some very tricky obstacles.
Ordinarily, bankruptcy proceedings would result in the discharge of a debt
as part of the process of granting the bankrupt a new start financially.
However, not all debts are dischargeable. (Think student loans.) In particular,
debts that are the result of “willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another
entity or to the property of another entity” are excluded from discharge.116 This
language—from Section 523(a)(6) of the bankruptcy law—has been held to
apply to judgments incurred by willful trademark infringement.117 Because
“[e]xceptions to discharge must be construed narrowly,”118 it is important to
note some differences between Section 523(a)(6) and a general standard of
willfulness upon which many default judgments are based. First, Section
523(a)(6) requires a “willful and malicious” act by the debtor. This requires an
intentional act, not merely a reckless one, and one that is intended to injure “or
which is substantially certain to cause injury.”119 Malice does not require ill will,
but it does require showing that the act was “wrongful and without just
cause.”120 However, in many of the default cases discussed above, the findings
suggest that the defendants’ acts would satisfy that standard.121
113 Whether they have a right to expect others to keep away from the line is a broader issue of
trademark law—and intellectual property law in general—beyond the scope of this Article.
114 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
115 See 10 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 55.82[2] (3d ed. 1999)
(Rule 60(b)(1) more stringent than Rule 55(c)). Defendant may have wished to concede liability
only. That could be accomplished by answering the complaint, admitting the allegations relating
only to liability, and denying those relating to willfulness while denying allegations related to
remedies. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8. But that assumes defendant has access to legal counsel to advise
defendant on the proper way to do this.
116 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012).
117 E.g., In re Butler, No. 11-40930-MGD, 2013 WL 5591922 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sept. 9, 2013).
118 Id. at *3.
119 Id., quoting In re Jennings, 670 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2012).
120 Id., quoting Holt, 173 B.R. 806, 812 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1994).
121 See, e.g., WFTV, Inc. v. Maverik Prod., LLC, No. 6:11-Civ.-1923-orl-28krs, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 86137 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2013). The court cited defendant’s refusal to cease using a
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Assuming that many default judgments with findings of willfulness would be
exempt from discharge, there is a matter of procedure to be considered. The
burden is on the person opposing discharge to demonstrate nondischargeability. In some cases, that can be accomplished by using issue
preclusion. Thus, in In re Butler, the court granted a motion for summary
judgment on the issue of dischargeability in a claim involving trademark
infringement and cybersquatting.122 The court first found that a jury verdict of
cybersquatting demonstrated willful and malicious conduct by virtue of the bad
faith intent to profit element.123 Second, although the court recognized that
even willful trademark infringement does not automatically constitute willful
and malicious conduct, it found enough evidence in the record to apply issue
preclusion to the trademark infringement claim as well and grant summary
judgment on the issue of non-dischargeability.124
Butler, however, imposed issue preclusion on a judgment resulting from a
trial on the merits before a jury. Default judgments do not stand in the same
position regarding issue preclusion. Because the default judgments we have
discussed involve federal questions, federal preclusion law ought to apply.125
Under Section 27 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, an issue must be
“actually litigated and determined” to be preclusive.126 It is not necessary for
there to be a trial on the merits; a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
or a motion for summary judgment would suffice.127 However, where the
judgment is the result of a default, “none of the issues is actually litigated.”128
Thus, it appears that the judgment creditor would have to introduce evidence of
willful and malicious conduct in the bankruptcy proceeding to prevent a

domain name after being asked to stop as evidence of willfulness. While refusal to comply with a
cease and desist request alone may not suffice for § 523(a)(6), the “bad faith intent to profit”
required by Section 43(d) may be sufficient. Moreover, the court in Maverik specifically found
that defendant had no reasonable basis to believe that it had a legitimate right to use the domain
name. Id. at *25.
122 In re Butler, 2013 WL 5591922, at *6.
123 Id. at *4–5.
124 Id. at *6–7.
125 Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507–08 (2001).
Federal
preclusion law in federal question cases generally follows the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. See
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893 (2008) (citing Restatement).
126 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS § 27, cmt. d.
127 Id.
128 Id. cmt. e.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2014

21

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 5

122

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 22:101

discharge of the default judgment.129 However, at least one court seemed to
believe that a bankruptcy court would adopt its findings of willful and malicious
conduct, even from a default.130
Even if the issue of willful and malicious conduct from a default is not
preclusive, there is another possible preclusion issue that may favor nondischargeability. The Supreme Court has stated that in diversity cases, the
federal preclusion rule is to follow the preclusion law of the judgment-rendering
state, absent countervailing federal interests.131 If that also means that we apply
state preclusion law to supplemental state claims in the original judgment,132
that could lead to preclusion as to those claims. Some states (apparently a
minority) give preclusive effect to default judgments.133 Therefore, even if a
plaintiff could not use preclusion to establish non-dischargeability of the federal
claims, it may be able to do so with respect to substantially identical state
claims, assuming the necessary findings were made in the original case.134
Regardless of whether preclusion applies, the fact that willful infringement
can prevent discharge of the debt in bankruptcy is significant. Unless the
judgment debtor is able to mount a significant defense in the bankruptcy
proceeding (something it would not or could not mount in the prior defaulted
case), it seems likely that many default judgments will not be dischargeable.
This enhances the value of the default judgments where willfulness is shown.

129 However, if, despite failing to answer, the defendant had appeared at the hearing on
damages in the default judgment proceeding, that might be deemed sufficient to allow a
bankruptcy court to determine that issues raised at the hearing were actually litigated.
130 Coach, Inc. v. Allen, No. 11 Civ. 3590, 2012 WL 5359579, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2012)
(citing § 523(a)(6)).
131 Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508.
132 See In re Kory, No. 11-64454, 2013 WL 1340215, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2013)
(following Michigan preclusion rules on the effect of default judgments).
133 See, e.g., In re Catt, 368 F.3d 789, 791 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Indiana as a state granting
preclusive effect to defaults and using preclusion in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding as to a
finding of fraud).
134 One question would be whether the state law claims could support the original damage
awards, many of which derive from the Lanham Act’s statutory damage provisions. While states
may have criminal counterfeiting statutes, or civil statutes permitting enhanced damages (such as
treble damages) for willful counterfeiting, they may not have statutory damage provisions
equivalent to § 35(c)(2). For example, the Model State Trademark Bill contains a remedies
provision that allows for enhanced damages, but does not contain a statutory damages provision.
See Model State Trademark Bill § 14 (INTA).
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V. COMPARING TRADEMARK DEFAULTS TO PATENT AND COPYRIGHT—
CONTRAST AND CONFLUENCE
Defaults in patent and copyright cases provide useful points of comparison
with trademark. Like trademark law, patent law allows awards of attorneys’ fees
in “exceptional cases.”135 Like trademark law, copyright law provides for
statutory damages with a wide range of possible damage awards.136 Below, we
examine how courts use these provisions in default cases as compared with
trademark defaults.
A. PATENT CASES

Patent law does not provide for statutory damages (it does provide for at
least a “reasonable royalty,” which is quite different and far less wideranging137). However, the court can treble whatever damages are found, but
only with a finding of willful infringement.138 The Federal Circuit has held that
this means there must be a showing of at least “objective recklessness” by clear
and convincing evidence.139 Like trademark law, patent law allows awards of
attorneys’ fees only in “exceptional cases.”140 But the interpretation of that
provision, including in default cases, does not mirror that of trademark law. It
is worth comparing patent defaults to trademark defaults with respect to fee
awards, as well as looking at treble damage awards where willfulness is relevant.
In general, there appear to be a few interesting differences between patent
and trademark cases when it comes to default judgments. There are many
fewer reported default judgment cases in patent than trademark. A broad-based
Westlaw search for such cases in 2012 and 2013 revealed a very large difference
in the number of relevant cases compared with trademark.141
35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
137 35 U.S.C. § 285. Infringement of a design patent gives a minimum damage recovery of
defendant’s “total profit, but not less than $250.” Id. § 289.
138 Parker West Int’l, LLC v. Clean Up America, Inc., No. C-08-2810, 2009 WL 2916664, at *7
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2009) (finding willfulness), citing Graco, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 785,
792 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
139 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
140 35 U.S.C. § 285.
141 A search for patent /p “default judgment” and date(>1/1/2012 and <1/2/2013), for
example, turned up only thirty-seven cases, of which fewer than ten turned out to be actual
default judgments in patent cases (a few actually were trademark cases). Running the search for
2013 cases returned only forty-three cases. Of these forty-three, fewer than ten were true patent
135
136
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The case of Reshare Commerce, LLC v. Antioch Co.,142 is illustrative of a
cautious approach to both enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff
requested enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees based on defendant’s willful
infringement. Although the court acknowledged that the complaint did allege
willfulness, it refused to award either enhanced damages or fees. It noted that
plaintiff failed to send any pre-suit notice to defendant.143 Moreover, it
emphasized that the allegations of willfulness in the complaint “are conclusory”
and did not indicate how plaintiff inferred defendant’s knowledge of plaintiff’s
patent.144 Also interesting was the court’s discussion of the effect of a default
on a finding of willfulness. The court stated that the default must be found
willful to support a finding.145 In the court’s words, “the court must be
persuaded that the defendant made a strategic decision and deliberately chose
not to appear.”146 This must be supported by some evidence in the record,
which the court found lacking.147 That attitude is markedly different from
trademark (or copyright) cases, where the reason for a default normally appears
to be irrelevant; a default usually created a presumption of willfulness in
trademark cases.148
Consider first attorneys’ fee awards, where the relevant statutory language is
the same. The Federal Circuit had held that a case must be shown to be
exceptional by clear and convincing evidence—the same standard is used for
awarding treble damages.149 This is a higher level of proof than the normal
preponderance (“more likely than not”) standard used in civil cases. No such
default cases (as in 2012, where several were actually trademark cases). A search for (lanham or
trademark) /p “default judgment” and date(>12/31/2011 and <1/2/2013) returned 135 cases,
most of which were relevant.
142 No. 11-2616(MOD/LIB), 2014 WL 309309 (D. Minn. Jan. 28, 2014).
143 Id. at *2.
144 Id. See also id. at *3 (discussing attorneys’ fees).
145 Id. at *2.
146 Id. (quoting United Pet Group, Inc. v. Axon US Corp., No. 13-Civ.-126(WFK) (MDG),
2013 WL 5592617, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2013)).
147 Id.
148 This is not to say that courts never award enhanced damages or attorneys’ fees in patent
default cases. See, e.g., SDS Korea Co. v. SDS USA, Inc., No. 2:12-Civ.-4053(WJM), 2012 WL
3114753, at *3–4 (D.N.J. July 31, 2012) (awarding enhanced damages and fees).
149 Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Clariti Eyewear, Inc., 605 F.3d 1305, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Forest
Labs., Inc. v. Abbot Labs., 339 F.3d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The United States argued that
clear and convincing evidence is an improper standard in a case recently decided by the United
States Supreme Court. Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, 26–27, Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon
Health & Fitness Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014) (No. 12-1184). See also id. at 37–38 (discussing the
fact that the Lanham Act has identical language but it is interpreted differently).
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heightened level of proof is ordinarily required in trademark default cases (or
non-default trademark cases for that matter).150 However, in Octane Fitness, Inc.
v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,151 the Supreme Court held that a clear and
convincing standard was not required by the patent statute.152 Moreover, the
Court overturned the Federal Circuit’s standard for awarding fees, which the
Court found overly restrictive.153 On the other hand, the Court did not view
the patent fee-shifting statute as stating a general preference for attorneys’ fee
awards. Rather, the Court indicated that district courts should have additional
discretion to determine when a litigant’s claims or conduct were sufficiently
“ ‘uncommon,’ ‘rare,’ or ‘not ordinary’ ”154 that fee shifting should apply.
However, the type of conduct that would trigger an exceptional case finding
(which the Court did not actually overturn) is similar to trademark law: willful
infringement, bad faith litigation conduct, and inequitable conduct before the
PTO.155 And it was not always clear whether the higher burden of proof was a
serious barrier in a default judgment case.156
150 But see Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 555–56 (5th Cir. 1998) (requiring
clear and convincing evidence in trademark case); Ashland v. Randolph, No. 3:13-21768, 2013
WL 5777172, at *5 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 25, 2013) (same); Filtration Sys. Worldwide, Inc. v. Gulf
Coast Filters, Inc., No. 08-0102-Civ.-FJG, 2010 WL 2134274, at *7 (W.D. Mo. May 26, 2010)
(same); Castrol, Inc. v. Pennzoil Quaker State Co., 169 F. Supp. 2d 332, 341 n.8 (D.N.J. 2001)
(same). Only Ashland is a default case, however. In Finance Investment Co. (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Geberit
AG, 165 F.3d 526, 533 (7th Cir. 1998), the court enunciated a clear and convincing standard, but
appeared to limit it to awards made to a prevailing defendant. In Kooh Chun Hing Kee Soy & Sauce
Factory, Ltd. v. Star Mark Management, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 2d 312 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), the court
expressly rejected a clear and convincing standard. Id. at 322 & n.13.
151 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).
152 Id. at 1758.
153 The Court stated that the Federal Circuit limited fee awards to situations “ ‘when there has
been some material inappropriate conduct,’ or when the litigation is both ‘brought in subjective
bad faith’ and ‘objectively baseless.’ ” Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1752, quoting Brooks Furniture
Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005). See id. at 1754 (elaborating
on the Federal Circuit’s standard for exceptional cases).
154 Id. at 1756. “We hold, then, that an ‘exceptional’ case is simply one that stands out from
others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position (considering both
the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was
litigated.” Id.
155 See Applied Materials, Inc. v. Multimetrixs, LLC, No. C06-07372 MHP, 2009 WL 1457979,
at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2009) (finding inequitable conduct before the PTO and litigation
misconduct); Parker W. Int’l, LLC v. Clean Up Am., Inc., No. C-08-2810EMC, 2009 WL
2916664, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2009) (finding willful infringement).
156 See, e.g., Ocean Innovations, Inc. v. Quarterberth, Inc., No. 1:03Civ.0913, 2010 WL 1957486,
at *4–5 (N.D. Ohio May 14, 2010) (finding willful infringement and awarding fees); Parker West
Int’l, LLC v. Clean Up America, Inc., No. C-08-2810, 2009 WL 2916664, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1,
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On the other hand, there are indications in some cases, albeit anecdotal, that
courts may have subjected claims of exceptional conduct under patent law to
greater scrutiny than under trademark law. For example, in Junker v. HDC
Corporation,157 the complaint alleged willful patent infringement by defendant.
Defendant contacted plaintiff to say that he had stopped selling the infringing
items and giving information on how many were sold.158 Despite defendant’s
default (which arguably admits the allegations of willful infringement), the court
refused to find willful infringement, citing defendant’s cooperation as noted in
plaintiff’s motion.
In Telequip Corporation v. The Change Exchange,159 the defendant, a Korean
corporation, defaulted in a patent infringement suit. Due to the difficulty of
establishing damages,160 plaintiff sought only an injunction and attorneys’ fees.
Plaintiff cited defendant’s default and defendant’s avoidance of service of
process as reasons to find the case exceptional. However, the court refused to
award fees, stating “that neither willful infringement nor defaults are unusual in
patent infringement cases.”161
In Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. ShoeScandal.com, LLC,162 the court also refused to
find a patent case exceptional, despite allegations of willfulness the court
deemed admitted by default.163 The court pointedly stated: “The bare default
finding of willful infringement is insufficient evidence of exceptional
circumstances to warrant an attorneys’-fees award.”164

2009) (same); Applied Materials, Inc. v. Multimetrixs, LLC, No. C06-07372, 2009 WL 1457979, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2009) (finding inequitable conduct by clear and convincing evidence, but
not clearly indicating why); see also Special Happy, Ltd. v. Lincoln Imports, Ltd., No. SA Civ. 0900074-MLG, 2011 WL 2650184, at *10 (C.D. Cal. July 6, 2011) (default as sanction for discovery
abuse; court finds case exceptional); Harodite Indus., Inc. v. Astechnologies, Inc., No. 02-40114,
2008 WL 544615, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2008) (finding willful infringement and awarding
treble damages plus attorneys’ fees though not citing the clear and convincing standard or
explaining why defendant’s conduct was willful).
157 No. C-07-05094, 2008 WL 3385819 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2008).
158 Id. at *1.
159 2007 WL 655734 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2007).
160 Id. at *1.
161 Id. at *2. The court also noted that plaintiff cited just one case (later reversed by the Federal
Circuit on other grounds) in which a defaulting defendant had been found liable for attorneys’
fees. Id.
162 No. Civ. 12-7382, 2013 WL 6185203 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2013).
163 Id. at *5.
164 Id. at *4. The court did indicate that pleadings deemed admitted by default could be
sufficient if there were “some additional extraordinary circumstances plead in the complaint.” Id.
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Though these cases may only be anecdotal evidence, they indicate that
attorneys’ fees awards in default cases may be somewhat less frequent in patent
cases than trademark cases.165 Whether that will change in light of Octane Fitness
remains to be seen. It is also noteworthy that the courts rested their decisions
on a lack of exceptionality, and did not use the clear and convincing standard as
a special barrier to a fee award.166 Perhaps courts perceive patent cases as more
“technical” and are more cautious about imposing penalties such as attorneys’
fees where only one side is present.
The same theme exists with respect to enhanced damages. Thus, in
Monsanto Co. v. Slusser, the court denied treble damages, emphasizing that it was
a default (as a reason not to award treble damages) and that the record did not
contain clear and convincing evidence of willfulness.167 The court did award
attorneys’ fees, but did so based on defendant’s prior actions related to the
litigation, not because of the deemed admissions.168
Although it differs from the standards employed in trademark and copyright
cases, a clear and convincing standard is not altogether surprising. Courts have
stated that the treble damage provision is, in essence, a punitive provision.169
Requiring a higher standard of proof before implementing a form of
punishment is not unreasonable. What is surprising is that patent law appears
to stand alone in this regard, at least in the area of intellectual property. Courts
acknowledge that the willfulness provisions of statutory damages in copyright
165 In 2013, no patent default case could be found in which the defendant completely failed to
appear and the court awarded attorneys’ fees. (In Monsanto Co. v. Slusser, No. 4:10 Civ. 255, 2013
WL 1316367 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 29, 2013), discussed below, the defendant appeared and
participated, though he did not actually answer the complaint.)
166 See Deckers Outdoor Corp., 2013 WL 6185203, at *4 (denying attorneys’ fees without discussing
clear and convincing standard); see also Innovative Office Prods., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2012
WL 1466512, at *3, *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2012) (finding defaulting defendant’s “failure to
participate in this action as willful and culpable,” but without any discussion of damages or
attorneys’ fees). Cf. Monsanto Co. v. Slusser, 2013 WL 1316367 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 29, 2013)
(denying treble damages but awarding attorneys’ fees for delaying the litigation, although without
mentioning the clear and convincing standard for the fee award); Rhino Associates, L.P. v. Berg
Mfg. & Sales Corp., 531 F. Supp. 2d 652, 658–59 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (no willful infringement where
defendant attempted to design around the patent; denying treble damages and attorneys’ fees);
Ingrid & Isabel, LLC v. Carey, 2011 WL 5983333, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2011) (in a patent and
trademark default case, finding no willfulness, citing only the patent attorneys’ fees statute).
167 Monsanto, 2013 WL 1316367, at *1.
168 Id. at *2. The court found that defendant’s prior conduct in the litigation “unreasonably”
delayed its progress. The court did not cite the clear and convincing standard when discussing
attorneys’ fees.
169 SDS Korea Co. v. SDS USA, Inc., No. 2:10-Civ.-4053 (WJM), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
107469, at *5 (D.N.J. July 31, 2012).
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and trademark cases serve a punitive function,170 yet there is little indication of a
desire to raise the burden of proof. Although Octane Fitness addressed only the
standard to be used when awarding attorneys’ fees, the absence of any statutory
support for a higher burden of proof may lead to the use of a preponderance
standard when awarding enhanced damages as well.171
Patent cases appear much less aggressive about labeling conduct as “willful,”
especially outside of the context of bad-faith litigation tactics.172 It is not
obvious whether the clear and convincing burden accounts for this difference,
as courts seldom discuss that issue in default judgment cases (though they do
usually cite the standard).
B. COPYRIGHT CASES

There are, perhaps unsurprisingly, many more copyright default cases than
Moreover, as discussed above, many trademark
patent defaults.173
counterfeiting cases use copyright cases as a guide to imposing statutory
damages. Copyright (Section 504(c)) and trademark (Sections 35(b) and (c))
have similar statutory damage structures: a very wide range, with a greatly
increased maximum for willful infringement. However, attorneys’ fees in
copyright cases are not limited to exceptional cases; the statute simply gives the
court discretion to award fees.174

170 See, e.g., Slusser, 2013 WL 1316367, at *1; Lucerne Textiles, Inc. v. H.C.T. Textiles Co., 2013
WL 174226, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2013).
171 See Octane Fitness Mfg., Inc. v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1758 (2014)
(noting that “patent-infringement litigation has always been governed by a preponderance of the
evidence standard”).
172 One patent case did find willful conduct essentially from the fact of default. However, it
cited trademark cases in support of this proposition, ignoring the possible differences—especially
the burden of proof—between the two. ThermoLife Int’l, LLC v. Sechel Holdings, Inc., No. 11Civ.-01256-PHX-PGR, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42419, at *13–14 (D. Az. Mar. 28, 2012). But this
case appears to be an outlier.
173 A search for 2013 copyright default judgment cases returned eighty-four results, most of
which were, in fact, copyright cases (sometimes combined with trademark cases). The same
search for 2012 cases yielded 100 results.
174 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012). In practice, fee awards in copyright cases are not routine. They
appear more frequently to be awarded in cases where plaintiff has acted willfully or in bad faith.
See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.10[D][3][b].
However, some courts maintain that fee awards should be regarded as the norm in copyright
cases. E.g., Micromanipulator Co. v. Bough, 779 F.2d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 1985) (maintaining that
fee awards should be regarded as the norm in copyright cases).
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Default judgments in copyright cases appear to be much closer in reasoning
to trademark cases than are patent cases. Willfulness175 is a factor in statutory
damages for copyright, which seems to be the measure of choice in copyright
defaults, for obvious reasons. It does not require any information from
defendant, although courts seem most comfortable when plaintiff supplies
some information about its losses, either profits or potential licensing fees—the
latter especially with respect to music.176 Although courts in default cases are
very reluctant to give close to maximum statutory damages in either trademark
or copyright default cases, willful infringement is a factor in the decision about
the amount of damages incurred.177 Moreover, as in trademark cases, judges in
copyright cases appear willing to view allegations of willfulness in the
complaint—accepted as true by default—or even the fact of default itself as a
basis for finding willful infringement.178 In fact, a trademark case citing a
copyright case even provided an explanation of the latter: the court opined that
an innocent infringer would not be likely to default.179 Moreover, willful
conduct is seen as permitting statutory damages to take on a punitive character,
increasing the amount awarded.180 Thus, as in trademark cases, courts tend to
treat a defaulting defendant as presumptively acting in bad faith. The problem,
of course, is that a defaulting defendant has little ability to rebut that
presumption. By contrast, patent cases do not appear to operate with the same
presumption.
175 As noted above, the term “willful” is not easily or consistently defined in law. On court,
quoting Nimmer, said that “ ‘willfully’ means with knowledge that the defendant’s conduct
constitutes copyright infringement.” See Fallaci v. New Gazette Literary Corp., 568 F. Supp.
1172, 1173 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). But see Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in
Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 460–63, 480–91 (2009)
(suggesting that the cases actually use a less rigorous standard).
176 E.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Center Court, LLC, No. 5:12Civ.1174, 2013 WL 1154189, at
*4 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2013); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Antigua Cantina & Grill, LLC, No. 2:12Civ.-1196, 2013 WL 460329, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2013) (citing cases).
177 Center Court, LLC, 2013 WL 1154189, at *3.
178 E.g., Lucerne Textiles, Inc. v. H.C.T. Textiles Co., No. 12 Civ. 5456, 2013 WL 174226, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2013); CJ Prods. LLC v. Your Store Online, LLC, No. 11 Civ. 9513, 2012 WL
2856068, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2012); Dumas v. Dogi, No. 88 Civ. 2293, 1990 WL 258343, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1990).
179 Chloe v. Zarafshan, 2009 WL 2956827, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2009) (trebling defendant’s
profits before awarding this amount to plaintiff for willful counterfeiting). See Fallaci, 568 F.
Supp. at 1173 (in copyright case, inferring willfulness from default “especially in light of plaintiff’s
allegation of willfulness and demand for ‘increased statutory damages applicable to willful
infringers’ ”).
180 Lucerne Textiles, Inc., 2013 WL 174226, at *3.
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Many copyright default cases appear to operate very much like trademark
cases. The major difference is that statutory damages are available in a large
percentage of copyright cases,181 whereas in trademark cases they are limited to
counterfeiting and cybersquatting. And attorneys’ fees in copyright cases do
not require an exceptional case,182 making it even more likely that they will be
awarded in a default case.
VI. STATUTORY DAMAGES AND DUE PROCESS
Large statutory damage awards, whether or not they result from a finding of
willfulness, often imply a punitive function to the award. There are many
examples of courts admitting the significant punitive aspect of the damage
award in default cases.183 When the punitive aspect far outweighs any
reasonable measure of compensation, a question of due process will arise. In
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,184 the Supreme Court held that a punitive
damages award that far exceeded the compensatory damages violated due
process.185 The Court cited a lack of “fair notice” to the defendant, especially
where civil fines for such conduct would be significantly less than the punitive
award, as a basis for its ruling.186 Thus, one may ask whether a large statutory
damages award, particularly one issued after a default, gives “fair notice” as
described in Gore.
Not surprisingly, in copyright cases, many of the same issues arise. As
discussed earlier, the copyright laws contain a statutory damage provision with a
wide range of possible damages. Moreover, as prominent scholars have argued,
statutory damages in copyright give courts extremely wide latitude as to the
amount with few guideposts, and findings of willful infringement (which
increase the range of possible awards) appear to be more frequent than
181 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2012) (no statutory damages are available if the infringement began before
registration of the copyright, unless, in the case of published works, registration occurs within
three months of publication).
182 Id. § 505.
183 E.g., Coach, Inc. v. McMeins, No. Civ. 3574, 2012 WL 1071269, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9,
2012); WFTV, Inc. v. Maverik Prod. LLC, No. 6:11-Civ.-1923, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86137, at
*35 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2013); Coach, Inc. v. Allen, No. 11 Civ-3510, 2012 WL 5359579, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2012). See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 909–10 (8th
Cir. 2012) (a non-default copyright case); Johnson & Johnson v. Azam Int’l Trading, 07-Civ.4302, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112755, at *40 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2013).
184 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
185 Id. at 581.
186 Id. at 583–84.
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Congress intended.187 Consequently, it has been argued that large statutory
damages in copyright should be measured against Gore’s standards.188 However,
the due process argument against statutory damages in copyright has not fared
well in the courts, leading one to believe that a similar fate would await any
attempt to make the same argument in trademark cases. The major impediment
is the Supreme Court’s decision in St. Louis I. Mt. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams.189 In
Williams, a railroad challenged a statutory damage award of $75—the allowable
range was $50–$300—for an overcharge of sixty-six cents on a train fare.190
The Court rejected the challenge, citing the “due regard for the public, the
numberless opportunities for committing the offense, and the need for securing
uniform adherence to established passenger rates.”191 Courts addressing
challenges to copyright statutory damages have cited Williams as the controlling
authority, rather than Gore.192 Appellate courts have been “extraordinarily
deferential” to lower courts, “even more so than in cases applying abuse-ofdiscretion review,”193 despite the fact that the available statutory range in
copyright far exceeds the range in Williams, and despite the fact that there is no
extrinsic regulatory scheme (such as for train fares) at the heart of the statutory
damage system. Courts appear to assume that since the ranges of statutory
damages are knowable in advance, unlike punitive damages, the notice issues
discussed in Gore are not as relevant to statutory damages.194
However, those copyright cases rejecting Gore were actively litigated by the
parties; the cases on which we are focusing are defaults. Although the
complaints appear to allege willful infringement in many cases and the damages
Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 175, at 457–60.
Id. at 464–97. See Ryan M. Hrobak, Is Your iTunes Playlist Worth Six Figures? Due Process,
Statutory Damages, and Peer-to-Peer Copyright Infringement, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1941 (2013); see also
Pamela Samuelson & Ben Shaffer, Unconstitutionally Excessive Statutory Damage Awards in Copyright
Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 53 (2009). But see Christopher K. Bader, Peer-to-Peer FileSharing, Due Process, and the Judicial Role, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 805 (2013) (arguing that copyright
statutory damages should not be cabined by due process).
189 251 U.S. 63 (1919).
190 Id. at 63–64.
191 Id. at 67. The Court did allow that an award “so severe and oppressive as to be wholly
disproportionate to the offense and obviously unreasonable” would violate due process. Id. at 66–67.
192 E.g., Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67, 71 (1st Cir. 2013) (Williams is the
applicable standard); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 907–10 (8th Cir.
2012) (same), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1584 (2013); Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc.,
491 F.3d 574, 587 (6th Cir. 2007) (same).
193 Zomba, 491 F.3d at 587.
194 Sony, 719 F.3d at 70; Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d at 907. Cf. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574 (“BMW did
not receive adequate notice of the magnitude of the sanction that Alabama might impose.”).
187
188
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presumably were requested in the complaint,195 it would not be obvious to an
untrained observer on the face of the complaint that the court’s damage award
may bear little relationship to any actual damages. Thus, one might assume that
the actual damages—which may be small—would be far less than the request,
and that default might be the better course of action. That the complaint states
the outer limit of what could happen does not necessarily constitute “fair notice”
of what is reasonably likely to happen. Moreover, the complaint would not
notify a defendant that the act of default would be a basis for finding willful
infringement and issuing punitive sanctions.196 In the copyright arena, it has
been suggested that courts should not find willful infringement in default
situations.197
One can readily find default cases in which the basis for statutory damages is
very thin. For example, in PetMed Express, Inc. v. MedPets.com, Inc., the court
awarded $800,000 in statutory damages for trademark counterfeiting.198
However, the court never explained why the defendant’s MedPets domain
names would be considered “counterfeits” of (instead of merely confusingly
similar to) plaintiff’s PetMeds mark. There was no indication in the opinion
that the complaint alleged counterfeiting.199 Indeed, the court conceded that
defendant was not selling counterfeit products.200 Thus, the use of the
counterfeiting statute appears misplaced. Although plaintiff presented some
evidence of willful infringement,201 the court specifically stated that it could
195 FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c), precludes granting a remedy in a default judgment that is different in
kind or amount from that requested in the complaint.
196 Here I am specifically referring to the cases discussed above where the act of default itself is
used as evidence of willful infringement. But the many courts that find willful infringement based
on defendant’s deemed admission of such allegations in a complaint should not escape due
process scrutiny. Even a more savvy observer of the complaint might assume that the predicate
act for punitive damages would have to be demonstrated by more than constructive admission of
allegations by default.
197 Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 175, at 506.
198 Petmed Express, Inc. v. MedPets.com, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1220–21 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
This represented $400,000 per infringing mark. The court also awarded $100,000 for
cybersquatting ($50,000 per offending domain name).
199 See id. at 1217–18 (discussing allegations of trademark infringement); id. at 1219–21 (discussing
statutory damages).
200 Id. at 1222 n.4. The court went on to state that “Plaintiff has established liability for federal
trademark infringement pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) and thus, has demonstrated that
Defendant’s domain names are counterfeit marks. . . . .” Id. at 1220 (emphasis added). Of course,
merely showing infringement does not demonstrate that defendant used a “counterfeit” mark.
201 The most damaging evidence was that defendant used 1888MedPets.com as a domain name,
and it did not correspond to a telephone number for MedPets. Id. at 1220.
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“infer willfulness from Defendants’ default.”202 When assessing damages, the
court asserted, with no apparent evidence, that “the fact that [the infringing]
marks appeared on the Internet, [means that they] reach[ed] a substantial
number of customers.”203 It would be particularly difficult to say that a
defendant has fair notice when a critical factor—the default itself—is not part
of the complaint, and does not obviously lead to a conclusion of willful
infringement.
By contrast, where courts find that defendant operated small stores, they are
sometimes less inclined to award substantial statutory damages, even when the
store sells counterfeit products.204
Given the large discretion and very deferential review allotted to trial courts
when granting statutory damages, Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Gore
may provide an additional basis for questioning statutory damages, especially in
default cases. Justice Breyer noted that in Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,205
the Court stressed
the constitutional importance of legal standards that provide
“reasonable constraints” within which “discretion is exercised,”
that assure “meaningful and adequate review by the trial court
whenever a jury has fixed the punitive damages,” and permit
“appellate review [that] makes certain that punitive damages are
reasonable in their amount and rational in light of their purpose
to punish what has occurred and to deter its repetition.”206
Although the constraints “need not be precise in order to satisfy this
constitutional concern,”207 the range of statutory damages, especially for
counterfeiting, is enormous and, by the courts’ own admissions, the constraints
on their discretion within that range are almost non-existent.208 Thus, although
Id.
Id.
204 See, e.g., Coach, Inc. v. Tom’s Treasure Chest, No. 2:10-Civ.-00243, 2011 WL 4399355, at
*3–4 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 21, 2011) (awarding $5,000 per mark, for a total of $30,000). But see Coach
Services, Inc. v. Wireless Star, Inc., No. 12-1123, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40361, at *3–4 (E.D.
Mich. Feb. 11, 2013) (finding Coach’s request for $2 million “reasonable” because a search
warrant turned up “seventeen counterfeit ‘Coach’ items” at defendant’s store, which could have
resulted in a maximum award (assuming no willfulness) of $3.4 million).
205 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
206 Gore, 517 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20–21).
207 Id. at 588.
208 Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 588 (6th Cir. 2007).
202
203
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the parameters of possible statutory damages are knowable in advance, it would
be difficult to predict where within those parameters a particular actor’s
conduct might fall.209 This is particularly true for a defendant who is deciding
whether to retain an attorney and contest the claim based on the allegations in
the complaint. Thus, one can argue that the complete lack of parameters gives
trial courts unconstitutionally large discretion, unfettered by any realistic
appellate review, especially in default cases where there effectively is no review.
However, given the obvious reluctance of courts to impose constitutional
restrictions on statutory damages, such an argument is not likely to find a
receptive audience in the courts of appeals.
VII. IS IT A PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED—AND HOW?
At one level, the issue of willfulness in default judgments is certainly a legal
problem. A level of malevolence is being imputed to defaulting defendants
largely, and sometimes entirely, without any evidence, whether by inference
from the fact of default or by accepting allegations in a complaint as true. In a
number of cases, however, there is more than just the act of default or
allegation of willful conduct. For example, in Rutt’s Hut, Inc. v. Mutt’s Hut
International, the court cited defendant’s failure to respond to a cease-and-desist
letter as “culpable conduct,”210 and held that attorneys’ fees were warranted in
light of this culpability and the fact that by ignoring the letter, the plaintiff was
forced to incur legal fees.211 Analogous sentiments can be found in other cases,
where courts cite defendant’s refusal to abide by or even acknowledge plaintiff’s
pre-litigation contacts as a basis for finding willful infringement.212 That leads
209 This is not to say that courts impose statutory damages wholly arbitrarily. Many courts
attempt to compare the case before them with previous cases. See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Banana
Ads LLC, 2013 WL 1873289, at *14–16 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2013); All-Star Mktg. Grp., LLC v.
Media Brands Co., No. Civ.11-03619, 775 F. Supp. 2d 613, 616–17 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Rodgers v.
Anderson, No. 04 Civ. 1149, 2005 WL 950021, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2005). But there are
few real guidelines for courts to follow apart from their own estimation of how the current case
compares with other cases. Courts sometimes fall back on guidelines used by courts in copyright
cases. E.g., id. at *2.
210 No. 11-1350, 2011 WL 2923697 (D.N.J. July 18, 2011).
211 Id. at *2. The plaintiff sought no damages and the nature of the infringement is not clear
from the court’s opinion.
212 E.g., World Entm’t, Inc. v. Brown, No. 09-5365, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55182, at *10 (E.D.
Pa. May 2, 2011) (citing defendant’s continued infringement after receiving cease and desist
letters); Coach, Inc. v. Melendez, No. 10 Civ. 6178, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116842, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011); WFTV, Inc. v. Maverik Prod. Liab. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86137,
at *47 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2013).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol22/iss1/5

34

Welkowitz: Fault Lines in Trademark Default Judgments

2014]

FAULT LINES IN TRADEMARK DEFAULT JUDGMENTS 135

to a subsidiary question: To what degree should we expect recipients to respond
to cease and desist letters?213 To someone without an attorney, but who
believes that he or she is not infringing, a cease and desist letter may be
intimidating. Moreover, a cease and desist letter may be overreaching beyond
the actual legal authority it cites.214 On the other hand, it may be reasonable to
expect some sort of response to such a letter, even if just a denial. But even a
denial is difficult to formulate without an attorney, especially in the face of what
may be complicated-sounding threats of dire consequences. Moreover, courts
that assert that a timely response to plaintiff’s entreaties would have obviated
the need for plaintiff to sue are assuming the accuracy of the letter in the
absence of actual evidence. On the other hand, there certainly are default cases
where large damages appear warranted and where defendant appears to be a
bad actor.215
Nevertheless, these assertions of willfulness go to the larger issue raised by
default judgments—to what extent should we accept allegations in a complaint
as true upon default?
In this section, I suggest some added procedures. They do not directly
address the substantive problems of the proper definition of and redress for
willful conduct, nor, at least directly, do they address the propriety of assuming
that defaulters are acting badly. However, they may indirectly ameliorate some
of the difficulties created by those substantive issues.
A. A REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE

As described by a leading treatise on practice and procedure, the main
purpose of the default judgment rule is to prevent an unresponsive party from
unreasonably delaying the diligent party’s entitlement to its claim.216 But that
does not explain the rule’s limited right to notice of a hearing after a default is
213 This question is probably most relevant with respect to relatively innocent or small-time
infringers. Knowing counterfeiters who operate on a larger scale are more likely to respond
disingenuously if they respond at all.
214 Coach was sued in 2011 over letters it sent to online retailers claiming that the goods those
retailers sold were counterfeit. The case was Kim v. Coach, Inc., brought in the Western District of
Washington. The complaint is at http://www.scribd.com/doc/48651879/Kim-v-Coach-Compl
aint (last visited July 11, 2013). See Grinvald, supra note 110, at 11–16 (listing characteristics of
abusive cease and desist letters); Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law,
65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 585, 589 (2008).
215 E.g., Coach, Inc. v. Pure MLK Last Stop, Inc., No. 12-Civ.-2254, 2013 WL 5888139 (C.D.
Ill. Nov. 4, 2013).
216 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 96, § 2682.
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entered. Only a party that has “appeared” has a right to receive notice of a
motion for a default judgment.217 Presumably, the drafters felt that a party who
has not bothered to indicate any interest in the case would not show up to a
hearing.218 However, the provision for notice is a very meaningful one. Before
a judgment is entered, the Rules permit the court to “set aside an entry of
default for good cause.”219 Once a judgment is entered, one must use Rule
60(b) to set aside the judgment.220 The specific grounds in Rule 60(b) for
setting aside a judgment are relatively limited; the most likely ones for a default
judgment would be “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”221
But one would not expect a court to readily give relief in default judgment cases
unless a very serious breach of propriety occurred.222 “Good cause,” on the
other hand, is potentially more lenient.223 Moreover, because a judgment has
not yet been entered, and because the default probably occurs relatively soon
after the action has begun, the prejudice to the plaintiff is normally small.224 Of
course, one must know about the default before a judgment is entered in order
to avail oneself of Rule 55(c).
One possible solution is for all defaults to trigger a notice requirement.
Whether this would lead to anything productive, rather than act as a delaying
tactic that increases plaintiff’s costs, is unclear. A less drastic alternative, at least
for intellectual property cases, would be to require notice of default sent to
defendants in situations where the complaint alleges willful conduct. This
would notify the defendant of the seriousness of the situation and give the
defendant an opportunity to defend, or at least contest damages, if it cannot
justify trying to set aside the default. A court could order this in its discretion,
but that is unlikely, since a default is entered by the clerk, not a judge, and the
judge has no reason to know about the default until after a motion for entry of
a judgment is made. There would have to be a standing local or judge-made

FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2) (seven day notice required if a party appears).
The Advisory Committee Notes in 1937 referred to the procedures of several states without
comment. There are no other comments on this procedure.
219 FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c).
220 Id.
221 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1). Rule 60(b)(6) has a catchall, but its use would be unusual here.
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 115, § 55.80[1], at n.3.
222 See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 115, § 55.82[2] (describing Rule 60(b)(1) more
stringent than Rule 55(c)).
223 See id. § 55.70[4], and accompanying cases.
224 See id. § 55.70[5].
217
218
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rule for this to be implemented under the current rule.225 A third alternative
would be a notice sent after the hearing but before the formal entry of
judgment, which would notify the defendant of the amount of imminent
liability.226
These notice procedures are not without risks. An unscrupulous defendant
could use the notice to seek ways to avoid the impending judgment (moving
money, reorganizing or going bankrupt, etc.). However, one would imagine
that service of a complaint would be almost as likely to trigger those same
reactions.227
Pre-judgment notice at least gives defendants an opportunity to contest the
issues of willfulness and damages. The risks of additional notice are small. In
most cases, the cost of additional notice should not be large. Mail service ought
to suffice in most cases and the court could make appropriate orders in more
difficult cases. But notice would not necessarily solve the problem. If the
defendant does not contest liability (by moving to set aside the default), it may
be deemed to have admitted willfulness. And if a defendant does not or cannot
contest damages, then the underlying issue will be the same—should a default
be sufficient reason to infer willfulness.
B. DEMANDING FURTHER PROOF

Another—or perhaps an additional—procedure is suggested by the default
rule in New York, which requires proof of facts by sworn affidavit.228 Since
willfulness is related to damages, and damages have to be proven, it would
make sense to require proof of willfulness independent of the allegations of the
complaint. As indicated above, some courts have looked at the evidence
outside the complaint—cease and desist letters, purchasers of goods (in the case

225 Such a rule would be possible, but would have to be consistent with the Federal Rules. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a).
226 Pennsylvania requires that all defendants receive ten days’ notice before a hearing on a
default judgment. PA. R. CIV. P. 237.1(a)(2) It also requires that the notice have specific content
that informs the defendant that he or she is in default for failure to answer, that a judgment may
be entered, causing loss of property or rights, and that defendant should consult a lawyer. Id.
§ 237.5. New York’s default rule is similar to the federal, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3215(a) (Consol.
2014), but it requires plaintiff to prove the facts by affidavit of the party. Id. § 3215(f).
227 If it does not, having a judgment may allow a plaintiff to put liens on property before
defendant can sequester the property in some way.
228 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3215(f).
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of counterfeits), and continued sales after receipt of the cease and desist
letter.229
Requiring further proof would replace the presumption or inference of
willful conduct from the default (or from deemed admissions of willful
conduct). Moreover, it would require a better definition of “willful” conduct.
Other possible procedures may be suggested by further examination of
defaults under copyright and patent law.230 At least some patent cases suggest
that deeming willful infringement from admission by default should require
more than a conclusory allegation of willfulness, for example.231
VIII. OBSERVATIONS, SUGGESTIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS
The prevalence of willfulness findings in trademark and copyright cases
suggests that courts are operating on the assumption that people of goodwill do
not ignore cease-and-desist letters, and, especially, do not ignore complaints
formally served on them. But it is worth remembering that the Federal Rules
giving notice of the complaint by mail.232 Even though the complaint comes
with official sounding forms to fill out a waiver of service, it is far from
implausible that some defendants will believe that the entire process is a scam
designed to obtain information.233 Thus, as indicated earlier, we may wish to reexamine the presumptions and provide extra process and even a higher burden
of proof; say, the clear and convincing standard used in patent cases, in order to
find willful infringement.
A second observation is that courts are not rubber stamps, automatically
granting default judgments. Courts (which includes both district judges and
magistrate judges, to whom the task of hearing damage requests is frequently
delegated) do seem to take the matter seriously. They examine the complaint
and not infrequently deny all or part of a default judgment motion for failure to

See supra notes 109, 210–12.
See supra Part V.A, discussing the clear and convincing evidence requirement in patent cases
for showing willful conduct to obtain treble damages and attorneys’ fees (with the caveat that it
may no longer be the proper standard).
231 See, e.g., Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. ShoeScandal.com, LLC, No. CC 12-7382, 2013 WL
6185203, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2013).
232 Technically, the rules encourage a waiver of service, with the waiver process accomplished by
mail. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1)(G).
233 If service is made by e-mail, or if a waiver of service is requested by e-mail, such a belief is
even more plausible, given the prevalence of phishing.
229
230
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plead a cognizable claim.234 They examine personal jurisdiction235 and
sometimes deny default judgments for lack of it.236 They do not automatically
grant plaintiffs the amount of damages they seek, especially statutory damages,
and especially when plaintiffs seek very large amounts.237 Nor do they
automatically grant the amount of attorneys’ fees requested.238
This leads to a third observation. The issues discussed here are not easily
separable from the larger issue of statutory damages. The majority of reported
trademark default judgments involving damages are in cybersquatting and
counterfeiting cases, where statutory damages are available. In trademark, as in
copyright, the available range of such damages is very large (especially if the
action is deemed willful) and the limits on the court’s discretion are very
small.239 Courts are understandably frustrated by defaults, which deprive them
of information that may be relevant to the exercise of their discretion.240
Moreover, if the perception is that defaulters are almost always bad people, then
it is likely that significant damage awards will be forthcoming. This suggests
that adding a few layers of procedure—prejudgment notice, greater proof of

234 E.g., Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Juijiang Hison Motor Boat Mfg. Co., No. 1:12-Civ.-20626, 2012
WL 2873733, at *7–11 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2012) (examining elements of confusion and false
advertising); eAdGear, Inc. v. Liu, No. Civ.-11-05398, 2012 WL 2367805, at *12 (N.D. Cal. June
21, 2012) (denying default judgment on copyright claim, while granting judgment on other
claims).
235 See eAdGear, Inc., 2012 WL 2367805, at *5–9 (examining personal jurisdiction and finding
that it did exist).
236 E.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Pedersen, 868 F. Supp. 2d 953 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2012).
237 E.g., Coach, Inc. v. Bags & Accessories, No. 10-2555, 2011 WL 1882403, at *7 (D.N.J. May
17, 2011) (granting statutory damages ten times the minimum, but denying request for 100 times
the minimum). But cf. Lucerne Textiles, Inc. v. H.C.T. Textiles Co., No. 12 CW 5456, 2013 WL
174226, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2013) (granting request for maximum allowable for non-willful
conduct, using willfulness to justify it and citing cases).
238 E.g., Mister Softee of Brooklyn, Inc. v. Boula Vending Inc., No. 10-Civ.-02390(ARR) (JMA),
2011 WL 705139, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2011) (default cases are not per se exceptional, even
where willful conduct is found, where mitigating factors exist), aff’d, 484 F. App’x 623, 624 (2d
Cir. 2012) (bad faith does not automatically entitle the opposing party to attorneys’ fees).
239 E.g., eAdGear, Inc., 2012 WL 2367805, at *12 (citing “wide discretion” of the court in this
matter).
240 A larger question is whether default judgments, especially in counterfeiting cases, with barely
cabined statutory damages, are an appropriate mechanism to deal with the defendants against
whom enforcement is most justified. Perhaps a better mechanism is criminal enforcement, which
is provided by federal and state law. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2320, 2323 (providing for criminal
penalties, forfeiture, and restitution); CAL. PENAL CODE § 350; N.Y. PENAL L. §§ 165.70–.74.
Perhaps some potential defendants would flee the jurisdiction. But, in that event, a default
judgment may also be an exercise in futility.
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facts, especially willfulness, and higher burdens of proof—could be helpful in
ensuring fairness for those defaulters who are not bad people.241 There is also a
spillover effect in the area of attorneys’ fees, at least with regard to trademark
cases. Unless they believe that significant statutory damages are sufficient to
cover attorneys’ fees242 courts usually award attorneys’ fees in cases where they
find willful infringement.
A fourth observation: my suggestions and my observations are tentative and,
at the moment, based on somewhat anecdotal impressions from the case law. I
have reviewed a substantial number of the cases from 2012 and 2013, but just a
relative handful from other years. Although I believe that these observations
will be borne out by a more systematic examination, I cannot claim real “data”
supports my impressions.
And a fifth observation. Perhaps the default cases can be a window into
trademark law more generally. Have we drawn the lines that separate “willful”
from “non-willful” sensibly? Are statutory damages being meted out
appropriately?243 How “exceptional” should cases be before we award
attorneys’ fees, especially in symbolically charged cases like cybersquatting
(whose elements include “bad faith”) and counterfeiting? There has been very
little thoughtful discuss by courts of these issues.
Finally, a conclusion. More process is useful, but only helps at the
periphery. A further step would involve pleading. To find willfulness, at a
minimum there should be sufficient factual allegations, beyond conclusory ones,
showing willful infringement. A better idea would be to require some actual
evidence of willful infringement. In any event, default by itself should not be
sufficient evidence of willful conduct.

241 Of course, in patent cases courts do not always cite or discuss the higher burden of proof.
See discussion of patent cases supra Part V.A. However, its existence (which is in doubt following
the Supreme Court’s Octane Fitness decision) may explain some of the reluctance of courts to give
enhanced damages in patent default cases.
242 One should remember that attorneys’ fees in a defaulted case are generally far less than a
litigated case, so that a significant statutory damage award, untethered to much evidence of real
damages, may well compensate for attorneys’ fees.
243 In the copyright realm, Professor Wendy Gordon’s commentary critiquing certain large
statutory damage awards and noting (somewhat in passing) that Canada limits such damages far
more severely, may provide a useful point of departure. See Wendy J. Gordon, The Lost Logic of
Deterrence: When ‘Sending a Message’ To The Masses: Outstrips Fairness, COGNOSCENTI, July 11, 2013,
http://cognoscenti.wbur.org/2013/07/11/joel-tenenbaum-wendy-gordon; see also Samuelson &
Wheatland, supra note 175 (another useful critique of statutory damages in copyright).
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There are questions left unanswered: What, precisely, do we mean by willful
infringement? Courts have not adequately answered this question.244 How
should courts go about awarding statutory damages in default cases? Where
there is no opposition to the request, there is a real danger of an improper
award, given the enormous range and discretion accorded courts in this area.
Because these are default cases, few appellate decisions exist to give guidance to
district courts. Here, at least, many courts appear to make an effort to be
careful. Nevertheless, district courts, and scholars, should attempt to create
better guidelines for default awards.

244 Although that question is beyond the scope of this Article, I intend to return to that matter
in the near future.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2014

41

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 5

142

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 22:101

APPENDIX
Year

# of
results

Willful
found

Willful
not found

No
discussion or
deferred

2013
2012

115
120

33
33

4
5

29*
43**

Nontrademark
or nondefault
45
38

* In 2 cases there was an award of attorneys’ fees without a discussion of
willfulness.
** In 9 cases there was an award of attorneys’ fees without a discussion of
willfulness.
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